Disgust sensitivity and meat consumption: a test of an emotivist account of moral vegetarianism.
Emotivist perspectives on moral reasoning hold that emotional reactions precede propositional reasoning. Published findings indicate that, compared with health vegetarians, those who avoid meat on moral grounds are more disgusted by meat [Psychol. Sci. 8 (1997) 67]. If, as per emotivist perspectives, such disgust precedes moral rationales for meat avoidance, then the personality trait of disgust sensitivity should generally be inversely related to meat eating. We surveyed 945 adults regarding meat consumption, reasons for meat avoidance, and disgust sensitivity. Contrary to the emotivist prediction, (a) meat consumption was positively correlated with disgust sensitivity, and (b) individuals who reported avoiding meat for moral reasons were not more sensitive to disgust than those who avoided meat for other reasons. We conclude that moral vegetarianism conforms to traditional explanations of moral reasoning, i.e. moral vegetarians' disgust reactions to meat are caused by, rather than causal of, their moral beliefs.